The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

企业物流系统的经济评价方法探析

文章通过对物流成本概念及其特性和物流成本系统化控制的分析,运用物流活动的经济评价的方法对物流系统的成本进行动态的经济评价,为企业提供物流成本控制与管理依据,以便企业能够及时准确的进行调整更有效更迅速的优化系统,使企业的物流成本大大降低,从而增强企业的竞争力。     

我国行业协会的性质和功能研究——从交易成本和规制角度分析

随着我国加入WTO以及市场经济体系的逐步完善,作为同行业企业联合的服务性组织——行业协会将在经济发展中发挥越来越重要的作用。但是长期以来,我国行业协会的性质和功能的定位一直比较模糊。本文从交易成本和交易规制结构出发,对我国行业协会的性质和功能进行界定:即行业协会的本质是一组企业契约联合体,行业协会最核心的功能在于降低成员企业的交易成本。     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

我国产权交易市场的特征及其市场失灵问题解析

市场经济条件下的市场调节功能失灵是普遍存在的现象,必须依靠政府监管和调控才能有效克服。我国现行产权交易市场的基本特征表明,国有资产所有者非人格化缺陷是我国产权交易市场失灵的最主要原因。必须尽快健全和完善我国国有资产监督与管理的法律体系,为各级国有资产管理部门履行出资人职责提供立法依据,建立起一个在政府有效监管下的行业和企业自律的产权交易市场。     

金融业统一监管的成本与收益分析

近年来一些国家相继实行了金融业统一监管,业界对此存在着不同看法,一些人主张进行金融业的统一监管,即将所有的监管机构统一到一个组织结构进行统一监管,而另一些人则对此持反对意见,主张继续实行多边监管,即分业监管。文章试图从统一监管成本与收益的角度来分析金融业实行统一监管的可行性。     

《萨班斯法案》孰是孰非:基于成本与效率(收益)的分析视角

《萨班斯法案》的出台堪称注册会计师行业的一件大事，从理论上看，该法案各项条款的出台确实具有积极的意义，但仍然存在缺陷，它更多地强调监管的作用，而监管的效率往往不如制衡的效率；它更多地强调经济处罚和刑事处罚的作用，而这两种处罚却必须以民事赔偿为前提，并最终使作假行为的作假成本大大高于作假收益。     

我国质量成本审计的探讨

本文根据质量成本的定义，分析质量成本的评估方法和生产过程的质量成本控制方法，进而探讨质量成本审计。     

VE在油田开发中的应用

孤岛采油厂历经30多年的开发,已处于特高含水期产量递减阶段。由于新井产量受到自然资源和投资的限制是有限的,要减缓原油产量的递减,依靠的是大量增产措施的投入,而每项措施的实施需要耗费几万元到几十万元的费用。所以,引起开发后期油田成本上升的主要原因是油田增产措施难度加大,投入相应增加。为此,我们引入VE原理,科学实施增产措施工作量,达到了降低作业成本,提高增油效果的目的。     

园林工程造价控制

结合园林建设的工程造价管理的实际情况，从园林建设的全过程系统地、多方位地探讨了工程造价控制的优化问题，以期能给园林建设的投资方、建设方及从业人员提供一些参考。